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COLLOQUIUM
THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION
FOREWORD
Bruce A. Green*
INTRODUCTION
In his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts analogized judges to
baseball umpires who only call balls and strikes.1 That is a questionable
analogy in general, given that judges’ oversight of court proceedings goes
beyond applying the law. But most especially, it is belied by judges’ role in
regulating law practice, including judicial practice. With respect to lawyers,
judges not only apply the law but make and enforce it. The eleven pieces in
this collection, briefly introduced here, reflect the breadth of courts’
authority.2
I. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Courts’ power starts with the authority to determine what work may be
done exclusively by a lawyer. This power is exercised through the
interpretation and enforcement of unauthorized practice of law (UPL) rules
and statutes. By interpreting “the practice of law” broadly, courts give
lawyers a legal monopoly not only to advocate in court but to give legal
advice and draft legal documents. State judiciaries can make exceptions by
“authorizing” nonlawyers to perform work that constitutes “the practice of
law.” Consequently, state judiciaries have it in their power to let nonlawyers
assist low- and middle-income people who cannot afford a lawyer’s help with
their legal problems.3 Some laws and administrative regulations make small
* Louis Stein Chair of Law and Director of the Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham
University School of Law.

1. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A
Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 551
(2009) (quoting Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation hearings).
2. The Stein Center’s collaboration with the Fordham Law Review now dates back more
than a quarter century. See Bruce A. Green, Deborah L. Rhode’s Access to Justice, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 841, 848 n.61 (2004) (listing books produced in the first decade of this
collaboration).
3. Some state judiciaries are currently experimenting with reforms to liberalize UPL
restrictions to enable nonlawyers to provide broader help with legal problems. See Arthur J.
Lachman & Jan L. Jacobowitz, Arizona and Utah Jumpstart Legal Regulatory Reform, LAW
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inroads into the lawyer’s monopoly by allowing nonlawyers to help with
others’ legal problems in some administrative proceedings and other
contexts, but the lawyer’s monopoly, for which courts have primary
responsibility, is broad and consequential.
Four coauthors—Jessica K. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F.
Shanahan, and Alyx Mark—uncovered one effort to offset overly restrictive
UPL rules.4 They describe how unrepresented parties in domestic violence
cases in two jurisdictions receive help from “a shadow network of nonlawyer
advocates,” with the knowledge, tacit consent, and collaboration of the trial
judges.5 Working in or near the courthouses, domestic violence advocates in
these jurisdictions meet with domestic violence survivors, counsel survivors
(while professedly refraining from “advising” them), and help survivors
develop evidence and draft their petitions. Judges with heavy dockets rely
on the advocates to help survivors in these ways and also draw on advocates’
views in making institutional changes. The authors describe this as an
example of the “de facto deregulation of the lawyer’s monopoly” and explore
questions raised by courts’ unwillingness or inability to make the advocates’
role more visible and to discuss it publicly.6
Presumably, these trial courts keep domestic violence advocates in the
shadows because they have doubts about their power to authorize nonlawyers
to practice law in their courts. A state’s high court could undoubtedly adopt
a rule or issue a ruling allowing nonlawyers to assist domestic violence
survivors under specified conditions, but trial courts may be unsure whether
this kind of authority trickles down to them. The trial judges’ reluctance to
publicly authorize nonlawyer advocates’ work means that they cannot adopt
explicit rules regulating this work and that the advocates themselves must
limit the help they can provide, in order to maintain that, by counseling rather
than advising, and by keeping silent in court, they avoid practicing law.
No doubt, the ad hoc, sub rosa, implicit “authorization” of domestic
violence advocates better serves the survivors and the courts than the
alternative of strictly enforcing UPL rules in a manner that leaves survivors
entirely on their own or with a modicum of help from overtaxed judges. But
one must wonder why judiciaries do not expressly permit these advocates’
work and other work like it performed by nonlawyers. It is hard to imagine
that the courts and public are best served when nonlawyers help
unrepresented parties in the shadows or not at all.
No problem of courts’ making, and therefore in their power to solve, is
more acute than that of access to justice for low- and middle-income clients.
Professor Steinberg and her colleagues remind us that it is only because
courts fail to let nonlawyers help unrepresented people with their legal
PRAC. TODAY (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/arizona-utahjumpstart-legal-regulatory-reform [https://perma.cc/C26M-W2VC].
4. Jessica K. Steinberg et al., Judges and the Deregulation of the Lawyer’s Monopoly,
89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 (2021).
5. Id. at 1316.
6. Id.

2021]

FOREWORD

1101

problems that domestic violence advocates are driven into the shadows in the
jurisdictions Professor Steinberg and her colleagues studied—and worse, that
domestic violence survivors elsewhere and so many others must handle legal
problems on their own when they so desperately need help that might
otherwise be provided by educated and regulated nonlawyers.
II. LICENSING PROCESSES
Judicial authority over legal practice also includes the power to license
lawyers. Each state judiciary oversees admission to the state’s bar, meaning
that each state judiciary decides what one must do to be licensed as a lawyer
in the state—for example, whether applicants to the bar must graduate from
an accredited law school and what they must study, whether applicants must
take a bar exam and if so, what will be tested, and what applicants must go
through to demonstrate the requisite “character” to practice law.
In her article on the state judicial licensing processes, Cassandra Burke
Robertson challenges whether contemporary bar exams are necessary and
sufficient to ensure law school graduates’ competence to practice law, as
broadly defined by courts.7 She points to evidence that these exams,
exclusionary in origin, still undermine racial, socioeconomic, and gender
diversity and she makes the case that the exams poorly test competence
because they put a premium on memorization and are not oriented to the work
that any particular new lawyer plans to do. Bar exams are currently changing
to become more useful and less discriminatory,8 but Professor Robertson
proposes more substantial changes not only to the exams but to the licensing
process itself. She argues for eliminating the bar exam—that is, providing a
“diploma privilege”—for law school graduates who practice in organizations
and for others who are not appearing in court or handling clients’ funds.
Professor Robertson argues that evaluations should focus on the particular
work that the remaining others will actually perform.
One peculiarity of the state court licensing process is that a state law
license does not necessarily authorize a lawyer to practice law outside the
particular state. Each state judiciary decides what out-of-state lawyers who
come to their states may do. Typically, a judge presiding over a case has the
power to allow an out-of-state lawyer on a pro hac vice basis to represent a
party in that particular case. State courts also adopt rules allowing out-ofstate lawyers to practice in the state temporarily, in certain circumstances,
outside court. But law licenses do not function like drivers’ licenses: state
courts do not generally offer reciprocity to lawyers from other states.
Gabriel “Jack” Chin reminds us of a further peculiarity of our federal
system: that a state law license likewise does not entitle a lawyer to represent
7. Cassandra Burke Robertson, How Should We License Lawyers?, 89 FORDHAM L. REV.
1295 (2021).
8. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Big Changes for Bar exam Suggested by NCBE Testing
Task Force, ABA J. (Jan. 4, 2021, 1:48 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/bigchanges-for-bar-exam-suggested-by-ncbe-testing-task-force [https://perma.cc/5S2G-J6H2].
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a client in federal court.9 To represent a client in a federal district court or
court of appeals, the lawyer must seek admission to that particular court’s bar
or seek admission in a particular proceeding pro hac vice. Moreover, after a
state-licensed lawyer gains admission to the bar of a particular federal district
court, the lawyer is not now entitled to practice law in all other federal district
courts. Professor Chin argues that this makes no sense, at least in criminal
cases, since “federal criminal practice involves application of a single body
of substantive criminal law, evidence, procedure, and sentencing law.”10
Ultimately, this additional restriction, which cannot always be overcome by
pro hac vice admission, burdens not only individual lawyers but also wouldbe clients who may be denied their counsel of choice.
III. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULEMAKING
Along with courts’ power to define law practice, and to say who may
undertake it, comes the power to adopt rules regulating lawyers’ conduct.
Busy state judiciaries do not draft the rules themselves or oversee the rule
drafting process, however. They largely rely on the American Bar
Association (ABA), which drafts the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,11
and on their own state bar associations, which, critics say, often favor
lawyers’ self-interest.12
To give a contemporary example: the District of Columbia Bar
Association has floated a proposal to limit sophisticated corporate clients’
ability to negotiate with their lawyers for greater protections than afforded
by conflict of interest rules or other rules governing the lawyer-client
relationship.13 Apparently, it is increasingly common for corporations to ask
their lawyers to adhere to “outside counsel guidelines” that include
restrictions such as a promise by the lawyers not to act adversely to corporate
affiliates or a promise not to represent competitors.14 In preventing lawyers
from putting loyalty, competence, and confidentiality at risk, conflict of
interest rules are meant to establish the “floor” below which lawyers may not
go, but the new rule would turn them into a ceiling: ostensibly to protect
future clients’ access to a broader array of lawyers,15 the rule would forbid
9. Gabriel J. Chin, Toward National Criminal Bar Admission in U.S. District Courts, 89
FORDHAM L. REV. 1111 (2021).
10. Id. at 1124.
11. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
12. See Emily S. Taylor Poppe, Evidence-Based Promulgation: Reconsidering the
Rulemaking Process for Rules of Professional Conduct, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1275, 1278 n.26
(2021).
13. See D.C. BAR RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT REV. COMM., DRAFT REPORT PROPOSING
CHANGES TO THE D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RELATING TO CLIENT-GENERATED
ENGAGEMENT LETTERS AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL GUIDELINES 5 (2020), https://www.dcbar.org/
getmedia/47f95789-27ca-4369-bbf4-3cab2097c32e/Draft-Report-on-OCGs-for-comment11-12-2020-FN [https://perma.cc/GGP3-A4BK].
14. See id. at 3.
15. See id. (noting the belief that outside counsel guidelines “unduly restrict the public’s
access to legal representation”).
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lawyers from negotiating for more loyalty than the conflict of interest rules
require. It seems fairly obvious whose interests the proposed rule is really
meant to protect, however.
Emily S. Taylor Poppe notes that critics responding to the problem of
regulatory capture, as well as those concerned with “the profession’s ongoing
failure to address inequalities in access to justice,” typically advocate for
other institutions to take responsibility for drafting professional conduct
rules.16 She proposes, however, that state judiciaries improve their own
rulemaking processes by adopting “evidence-based promulgation,” which
would include “drawing on best practices developed in other rulemaking
contexts, developing mechanisms for integrating external expertise,
formalizing consumer protections, and considering the composition of
rulemakers.”17 Among the reforms that would follow, says Professor Poppe,
would be to reduce the bar’s influence by drawing on the expertise of
nonlawyers and particularly consumers of legal services, as well as
diversifying the bodies that decide which rules to adopt.18 If successful, these
procedural reforms would lead to better professional conduct rules and
legitimize the bar’s influence over their development.
John S. Dzienkowski and John M. Golden similarly propose that, in
adopting and interpreting professional conduct rules, state courts make
procedural changes but of a different sort.19 They find inspiration in how
federal courts review regulations adopted by administrative agencies and
how they review agency opinions on questions of statutory interpretation.
First, the coauthors advocate that before adopting rules proposed by bar
associations, courts take a “hard look” at how the proposed rules were
developed to ensure that the bar gave outsiders a meaningful chance to
comment and responded reasonably and ultimately that the bar provided
reasoned, not arbitrary, justifications for the proposed rules.20 Second, in
deciding how much weight to give to a bar association’s opinion about what
a rule means, courts should consider “the quality of the [bar’s deliberative]
process and the reasoning that generated” the opinion.21
It is important for courts to attend to the professional conduct rules and the
processes by which they are adopted, rather than simply rubber-stamping bar
associations’ proposals, because the rules matter. True, they may
unjustifiably promote lawyers’ self-interest, but conversely, as Anna Offit
shows, they may also serve the public good.22 Professional conduct rules are
not simply codifications of long-held and commonly accepted
16. Poppe, supra note 12, at 1276.
17. Id. at 1280.
18. Id. at 1285–88.
19. John S. Dzienkowski & John M. Golden, Reasoned Decision-Making for Legal Ethics
Regulation, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2021).
20. Id. at 1126–27.
21. Id. at 1148.
22. Anna Offit, Playing by the Rule: How ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) Can Regulate Jury
Exclusion, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257 (2021).
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understandings. They have the power to change how lawyers behave, she
explains, because, wholly apart from instilling fear of formal discipline, the
professional conduct rules have an expressive function that discourages bad
conduct, and they serve as a basis for informal sanctioning by one’s peers.
The rules are vitally important, she asserts, “as both a moral compass and
practical deterrent for self-conscious practitioners.”23
Offit’s focus is on ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), a controversial rule recently
broadened by the ABA. 24 The rule targets harassment and discrimination in
the practice of law that is based on race, sex, religion, and other specified
characteristics. Professor Offit’s interest is in the rule’s power to discourage
lawyers’ discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury trials. She
points to an explanatory comment recognizing that the rule does not proscribe
“legitimate advocacy” and, in particular, that a rule violation is not
established whenever a court finds that an advocate violated Batson v.
Kentucky25 by using a peremptory challenge discriminatorily.26 Professor
Offit underscores the comment’s implication:
that, under some
circumstances, Batson violations do violate the rule. She also emphasizes
the rule’s extension to conduct that the lawyer “reasonably should know” is
discriminatory or harassing. Professor Offit is optimistic that the rule “can
encourage greater vigilance, care, and consciousness of Batson on the part of
attorneys engaged in routine assessments of prospective jurors.”27
Along with courts’ power to shape lawyers’ behavior by adopting
professional conduct rules comes oversight of the disciplinary processes
through which these rules are enforced. State supreme courts have the last
word on whether a lawyer has violated the rules and should be sanctioned,
possibly by being suspended or disbarred for doing so. Nancy Leong
examines state courts’ disciplinary processes with an eye toward their
enforcement of Model Rule 8.4(g) and emphasizes the problem caused by
many state supreme courts’ lack of racial and gender diversity.28 A court is
likely to interpret the rule differently, she argues, if the court is diverse, rather
than all white and mostly male.29 And diverse judges are more likely to
empathize with lawyers and victims with whom they identify.30 Therefore,
the demographic makeup of state courts “is a feature of the attorney
regulation system that carries substantive consequences.”31 The problem is
compounded, Professor Leong argues, because the disciplinary process
operates largely in secret.32

23. Id. at 1273.
24. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
25. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
26. Offit, supra note 22, at 1271–73.
27. Id. at 1271.
28. Nancy Leong, State Court Diversity and Attorney Discipline, 89 FORDHAM L. REV.
1223 (2021).
29. Id. at 1233–34.
30. Id. at 1227–28.
31. Id. at 1234.
32. Id. at 1232.
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IV. SUPERVISION OF ADVOCATES
Another source of courts’ authority over the bar is individual judges’
power to regulate lawyers appearing before them by establishing and
enforcing standards of conduct. Trial courts are not limited to referring
lawyers’ misconduct to disciplinary authorities. They can employ a host of
formal and informal sanctions and remedies (monetary sanctions,
disqualification of counsel, suppression of evidence, and rebukes and other
forms of shaming, among others) for a host of transgressions (filing frivolous
claims, courtroom misconduct, and conflicts of interest, among others). Nor
are courts limited to applying professional conduct rules and other laws.
They have inherent authority to establish further expectations for advocates
via ad hoc decision-making. In contravention of the notion that judges, like
umpires,33 have a limited role, consider trial judges’ role when they sanction
courtroom misbehavior by employing their power to summarily hold lawyers
in contempt of court: in that event, the judge acts as witness, prosecutor,
adjudicator, and sentencer.34
Adam M. Gershowitz examines how trial courts regulate criminal
prosecutors in particular.35 There is an ever-growing body of literature on
prosecutorial misconduct and what to do about it. Of particular concern is
prosecutors’ failures to comply with disclosure obligations under Brady v.
Maryland36 and other law, but prosecutors’ Batson violations and their
improper jury arguments are also recurring concerns. Recognizing that these
transgressions are often the result of inadequate training, not venality,
Professor Gershowitz proposes an innovation that would test the limits of
courts’ regulatory power: individual judges might require that, to be allowed
to appear in the judge’s courtroom, prosecutors first be trained on their
professional obligations.37 While recognizing that professional education
requirements are ordinarily imposed by state supreme courts or legislatures,
not by individual trial judges, Professor Gershowitz identifies three possible
sources of authority: trial courts’ “inherent authority to regulate the lawyers
who appear before them,” their rarely used power to ban prosecutors for acts
of misconduct, and the gatekeeping authority they employ when ruling on
pro hac vice motions.38 Professor Gershowitz’s discussion underscores that
regulating law practice is not just a task for judiciaries but is also a

33. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
34. See Bruce A. Green, Federal Courts’ Supervisory Authority in Federal Criminal
Cases: The Warren Court Revolution That Might Have Been, 49 STETSON L. REV. 241, 263
(2020) (“The very idea of the summary criminal contempt process, in which the trial judge
serves essentially as grand jury, prosecutor, victim, witness, trial judge, and sentencer,
challenges ordinary notions of fair process.”).
35. Adam M. Gershowitz, The Race to the Top to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 89
FORDHAM L. REV. 1179 (2021).
36. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
37. Gershowitz, supra note 35, at 1180.
38. Id. at 1190.
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responsibility of individual judges and that trial judges’ considerable power
implies an obligation to use it as necessary to improve professional practice.
One particular context where trial judges do recognize their responsibility
to actively supervise lawyers’ conduct is in class action lawsuits, where,
Brian T. Fitzpatrick observes, trial judges are sometimes characterized as
fiduciaries for absent class members.39 Accordingly, civil procedure rules
assign tasks to trial judges that they do not have in conventional litigation,
including deciding early on whether a would-be lawyer for the class is
adequate to serve in that role. Professor Fitzpatrick looks at trial judges’ task
at the end of a successful class action to set class counsel’s fees. He draws
on agency law to argue “that judges should set fees in the same way rational
class members would have set them at the outset of the case if they had had
the opportunity to do so.”40 This requires keeping in mind that like clients,
judges have limited ability to monitor lawyers to ensure they are not serving
their own interests by making quick but inadequate settlements, on the one
hand, or by dragging out the litigation, on the other. For guidance on how
rational plaintiffs negotiate fees to avoid the agency costs of monitoring
counsel, Professor Fitzpatrick examined how sophisticated corporate clients
hire litigators on a contingency fee basis. He found that corporate plaintiffs
typically agree to a contingent fee based either on a fixed percentage of the
recovery or on percentages that increase as the litigation moves forward.41
This practice calls into question how judges, relying on received wisdom,
often set fees in successful class actions—that is, either by lowering the
lawyer’s percentage of the recovery as the recovery increases or by capping
the amount of the recovery in light of the lodestar (the amount that class
counsel would have been paid on an hourly fee basis).42
For better or worse, trial judges regulate advocates’ conduct in many ways,
and setting class counsel’s legal fees is just one of them. Professor
Fitzpatrick’s argument that, in this example, trial judges fall short in
employing their regulatory—and fiduciary—authority, leads to the question
of who has responsibility for convincing trial judges to do better. In this
example, the candidates include civil procedure rule drafters, appellate
courts, and class counsel in their advocacy role. But it seems inescapable
that trial judges are ultimately responsible for how they exercise their
authority in general and in the class action setting in particular. Among other
things, this calls for questioning received wisdom.

39. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, A Fiduciary Judge’s Guide to Awarding Fees in Class Actions,
89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1151 (2021).
40. Id. at 1152.
41. Id. at 1161–63.
42. Id. at 1166–70.

2021]

FOREWORD

1107

V. JUDICIAL SELF-REGULATION
The characterization of law as a “self-regulating profession” has been
derided as a “myth,”43 given that lawyers are not regulated by bar
associations but by courts as well as by other institutions.44 By contrast,
judges and judiciaries, which adopt and enforce codes of judicial conduct,
are fairly described as self-regulating. Consequently, judicial conduct rules,
to an even greater extent than professional conduct rules, are subject to
regulatory capture.
At the same time, like professional conduct rules, judicial conduct rules
can serve the public. Toward that end, Tom Lininger argues that the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Ethics,45 from which most state courts draw in
adopting their state judicial conduct codes, should explicitly address lowincome individuals’ needs.46 Right now, he argues, the adjudicative system
is stacked against low-income litigants, most of whom are unrepresented in
civil cases and many of whom are represented poorly in criminal cases. He
offers eight proposals to make the process fairer and less discriminatory
toward low-income individuals. Among these, Professor Lininger suggests
amending judicial conduct provisions to call on judges “to promote access to
justice” and to promote procedural and substantive fairness without regard to
parties’ and witnesses’ resources or ability to secure counsel. Further, the
rules should require judges to enable all litigants, including those
representing themselves, “to be fairly heard.”47 In criminal cases, he would
assign judges a responsibility to monitor criminal defense lawyers’ caseloads
and to ensure in general that they are performing competently and free of
conflicts of interest.48 And, addressing the subject of a recent ABA
opinion,49 Lininger proposes judicial conduct rules requiring that before
incarcerating or punishing litigants for failing to make required payments of
fines, fees, and bail, judges inquire to ensure that these litigants actually have
the ability to pay.50
Finally, Renee Knake Jefferson looks at the less benevolent side of judicial
conduct: how judiciaries deal with judges’ sexual misconduct.51 Although
the federal judiciary amended the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
in 2019 to expressly target judges’ sexual misconduct and harassment of law
clerks and others in the judicial workplace, Jefferson views this as a tepid
43. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147
(2009).
44. See Poppe, supra note 12, at 1276 (“Lawyers increasingly face regulation from other
quarters.”).
45. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
46. Tom Lininger, Judges’ Ethical Duties to Ensure Fair Treatment of Indigent Parties,
89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1237 (2021).
47. Id. at 1246.
48. Id. at 1247–48.
49. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 490 (2020).
50. Lininger, supra note 46, at 1249–50.
51. Renee Knake Jefferson, Judicial Ethics in the #MeToo World, 89 FORDHAM L. REV.
1197 (2021).
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response to a problem that is largely discussed only in “whisper networks.”52
She calls for changing judicial cultures through a combination of official
acknowledgments when judges are found to have engaged in sexual
misconduct and more concrete reforms: “a comprehensive harassment
policy” including “a confidential reporting system”; a national clearinghouse
with responsibility for policymaking, training, and processing complaints;
annual reporting of complaints; procedural rules making judges more
accountable; and a ban on judges’ romantic and sexual relationships with
judicial personnel.53 Jefferson closes with a challenge to the concept of
judicial self-regulation: “if the courts will not police their own, legislatures
should step in and do so.”54
CONCLUSION
While each piece in this collection examines a discrete topic, the writings
collectively pose a challenge to how courts fulfill their responsibility to
oversee the practice of law, including judges’ own conduct. Largely as a
matter of happenstance rather than forethought, regulatory power—e.g.,
licensing, rulemaking, professional discipline, trial sanctioning, class action
oversight—is divided among federal and state judiciaries and individual trial
judges. From the perspective of the bar, to whom the least regulation may
seem best, the disaggregation of regulatory authority among different judicial
bodies and judges may be welcome: like the division of executive authority
among administrative agencies, the division of power among different courts
and judges serves as a check on overregulation and abuse. But the results
may also include discordant regulatory approaches, overreliance on bar
associations, and the failure to use regulatory power to salutary ends.
The writings here address a host of problems in how justice is
administered, particularly with respect to vulnerable individuals—lowincome litigants who cannot secure lawyers, criminal defendants, absent
class members, and victims of sexual harassment to name a few. These are
problems for which courts should take responsibility, whether because they
are created or exacerbated by courts or because courts have the power to
address them, or both. The writings alert us to the risk that judges will use
their considerable regulatory power to serve lawyers’ interests or their own
interests, but they also underscore judges’ ability to use their power for the
public good, including in innovative ways. The writings call, explicitly or
implicitly, for reconsidering received traditions and settled practices—
including by reconsidering the bar exam, federal district courts’ separate
admission processes, or methods for setting legal fees in class actions. The
pieces also call for reconsidering courts’ processes for adopting professional
conduct rules, for interpreting the rules, and for deciding whether and how to
discipline lawyers for violating the rules. On balance, the writings call for
greater engagement—dare one say “activism”—on the part of judiciaries
52. Id. at 1201–02.
53. Id. at 1218.
54. Id. at 1221.
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and judges in the work of regulating the practice of law, the bar, and the
judiciary itself.
I close by expressing my gratitude to the authors who contributed their
works to this collection and participated in the Colloquium out of which it
grew; to the current and outgoing Fordham Law Review editors and staff for
editing this collection and helping to organize the Colloquium; and to
generations of Fordham Law Review editors past, present, and future, for
their ongoing commitment to scholarship, like the work contained in this
collection, that advance discussion and understanding of the legal profession.
This year’s Colloquium pieces should get judges thinking!

